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  1Abstract 
This paper examines the long-run pre- and post-takeover performance of 
hostile takeovers in the U.K. from 1985-96. Prior to takeover, targets in 
hostile takeovers experience a significant deterioration in profit returns, and 
significantly negative share returns. However, there is little evidence that 
profit levels are lower than those of non-merging firms. Bidders in hostile 
takeovers are not superior performers in terms of profit levels, although 
share returns are significantly high prior to takeover. However, in the post-
takeover period hostile takeovers show significant improvements in profit 
returns, which are associated with significant asset disposals. In contrast, 
friendly takeovers do not improve profit returns and result in significantly 
negative long-run share returns. We find no evidence of an inverse relation 
between the performance improvement in hostile takeovers and the pre-
takeover performance of the target. We interpret the results to indicate that 
although hostile takeovers improve performance, there is little evidence that 
they play an important role in reversing the nonvalue maximizing behaviour 
of target companies. 
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  2Introduction 
 
In the capital markets of the U.S. and the U.K., hostile takeovers 
are considered to perform an important role; that of reversing the 
nonvalue maximizing strategies of underperforming companies. 
Manne (1965) argues that by taking over such companies, 
acquiring firms can replace the inefficient management and their 
policies, improve performance and realize a capital gain on their 
investment. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argue that 
takeovers driven by such disciplinary motives are more likely to be 
hostile in character, whilst takeovers undertaken to achieve 
synergies between bidder and target firms are more likely to be 
friendly in character. Whether hostile takeovers actually perform 
this disciplinary function is a controversial issue, and the subject of 
investigation in this paper. In particular, we examine three 
generally accepted conditions of the disciplinary hypothesis of 
takeovers.  
 
Brealy and Myers (1991, p. 945) argue that, “there are always 
firms with unexploited opportunities to cut costs and increase sales 
and earnings. Such firms are natural candidates for acquisition by 
other firms with better management. In some instances ‘better 
management’ may simply mean the determination to force painful 
cuts or realign the company’s operations…. If this motive is 
important, one would expect that firms that perform poorly tend to 
be targets for acquisition.” Target underperformance can be an 
industry-wide phenomenon as well as being firm-specific. Jensen 
(1986) argues that general shocks can lead to underperformance in 
a whole industry, because incumbent managers as a whole find it 
difficult to adapt to a new environment. Studies for both the U.S. 
and the U.K. have failed to find clear evidence of firm-specific 
target underperformance in hostile takeovers
1, although there is 
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would also expect to observe an improvement in the performance 
of the combined firms. Although there is evidence that the 
anticipated gains in hostile takeovers are large and significantly 
larger than in friendly takeovers
3, studies for the U.S. have not 
found that hostile takeovers improve the performance of the 
combined enterprise
4. Any improvement may be accompanied by 
significant changes in the policies of target management. The 
change in policies could take the form of disposals of poorly 
performing assets (Jensen, 1986), reductions in the number of 
employees (Shleifer and Summers, 1988), and long term 
investments (Stein, 1989). There is strong evidence of asset 
restructuring following hostile takeovers
5, 6. However there is little 
evidence of employee appropriation or reductions in capital 
expenditure (Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).  
 
While all firms, even those with good management, can 
theoretically be improved by better management, the potential for 
improvement is clearly greater in firms that are performing poorly. 
Therefore, another conjecture of the disciplinary hypothesis is that 
“the value of wrestling control of a firm from incumbent 
management is inversely proportional to the quality of that 
management. In general, the value of control will be much greater 
for a poorly managed firm that operates at below optimum capacity 
than for a well managed firm” (Damodaran, 1997, p. 687). The 
same prediction is not made for takeovers carried out for synergy 
motives. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1997) argue that the relative 
post-takeover performance of hostile and friendly takeovers 
depend on the value of the target’s strategy and management 
before takeover. “If the pre-takeover strategy or management was 
ineffective, a hostile takeover that replaced management and 
abandoned a failed strategy would be superior to a friendly 
transaction that did not make changes. However, if the pre-
takeover strategy was effective, the management change, 
organizational disruption, and change in direction associated with a 
  4hostile takeover would reduce performance after takeover” (p. 50). 
There is some evidence for the U.S. to suggest that this is indeed 
the case 
7. This theory predicts that the performance improvement 
in hostile takeovers may be expected to be greater, the worse the 
performance of the target. 
 
The objective of this study is to examine these three hypotheses by 
studying the long run pre- and post-takeover performance of a 
comprehensive sample of hostile takeovers involving U.K. firms 
covering an 11-year period from 1985-1996. Relative to the 
existing literature, our contributions include (1) the examination of 
both share and profit returns for the same sample of takeovers over 
the long run pre- and post-takeover periods, and (2) an 
examination of the effect of the pre-takeover target performance on 
long run post-takeover performance. 
 
We find clear evidence that targets in hostile takeovers 
underperform in terms of share returns in the one-year prior to the 
takeover. However, there is only weak evidence that targets 
experience low levels of profitability. We find that bidders in both 
hostile and friendly takeovers perform significantly well in terms 
of share returns in the pre-takeover period. There is no evidence 
that the pre-takeover performance of bidders in hostile takeovers is 
superior to that of bidders in friendly takeovers. In the post-
takeover period, we find strong evidence that hostile takeovers 
result in improved profitability in comparison with nonmerging 
firms. These increases arise from improvements in operating profit 
margins, and are associated with significant asset disposals. In 
contrast, friendly takeovers do not result in improved profitability. 
Announcement period share returns are significantly high in both 
hostile and friendly takeovers, but in friendly takeovers they are 
followed by significantly negative share returns in the post-
takeover period. We find no evidence of an inverse negative 
relation between the performance of hostile takeovers and the pre-
takeover performance of the target. Overall, we consider this 
  5evidence to provide little support for the view that hostile 
takeovers perform an important disciplinary function in the U.K. 
stock market.  
 
Section 2 describes the data and the methodology. Section 3 
reports results on the pre-takeover performance of targets and 
bidders. Section 4 provides evidence on the post-takeover 
performance of hostile and friendly takeovers. Section 5 examines 
the relation between the post-takeover performance of takeovers 
and the pre-takeover performance of targets. Section 6 concludes.   
 




The U.K. and U.S. are to be distinguished from other industrial 
countries by their comparatively high level of takeover activity, 
and the presence of active markets for corporate control, which 
result in a high level of hostile takeover activity. Fig. 1 shows the 
number of takeover bids for U.K. listed firms from 1970 to 1998. 
The mid-1980s included peak rates of activity comparable with 
those of the historically unprecedented levels of the early 1970s. 
Takeover activity decreased substantially in the early 1990s, but in 
the late 1990s increased to levels higher than those of the 1980s. 
This overall pattern is similar to that observed in the U.S. 
(Schwert, 2000).  
 
Fig. 1 also shows the number and proportion of hostile takeover 
bids in the U.K. A hostile bid is defined as one in which the target 
board’s initial reaction is to recommend target shareholders to 
reject the offer. Hostile takeover bids account for 23% of all 
takeover bids over the entire period
8. This proportion is very 
similar to that of the U.S. Using the same definition of hostility, 
Schwert (2000) reports that over the period 1980-94, 21% of all 
offers were hostile. In contrast to the U.S. and the U.K., in most of 
  6continental Europe there is little or no market for corporate control 
(see, e.g., Franks and Mayer, 1996). Therefore the U.K. is one of 
the few countries other than the U.S. where hostile takeovers can 
be studied. Fig. 1 shows that the 1980s witnessed an increase in 
both the number and proportion of hostile takeover bids. In the 
1990s both the number and proportion of hostile takeovers 
decreased substantially. From 1985-89, the proportion of hostile 
bids was 27.3%, whilst from 1990-94 the proportion was 22.5%. 
This is consistent with the decline observed in the U.S. by Schwert 
(2000), and casts some doubt on the interpretation that the U.S. 
decline results from the introduction of antitakeover devices, such 
as poison pills and state antitakeover laws, since no comparable 
developments took place in the U.K. 
9.  
 
We examine a comprehensive sample of hostile takeovers of U.K. 
public companies by U.K. public companies, completed between 
January 1985 and June 1996. We compare the performance of the 
sample companies involved in hostile takeovers with a matched 
sample of friendly takeovers, and with a matched sample of non-
merging control firms. The sample data is drawn from Acquisitions 
Monthly, which reports a total of 320 hostile takeover bids for 
U.K. listed companies over this time period. In selecting a matched 
sample of friendly takeovers to compare with hostile takeovers, we 
consider it important to select friendly takeovers from the same 
industry as those of hostile takeovers. As pointed out above, 
evidence shows that hostile takeover bids take place in poorly 
performing industries (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988). 
Therefore, if the performance effects of takeover differ by industry 
(even after controlling for industry performance), bias may be 
introduced into the analysis. To control for this, we match each of 
the 320 hostile takeover bids with a friendly takeover bid by the 
industry (2 digit SIC) of the target, and the year of the takeover 
bid. Friendly takeover bids are defined as where the initial reaction 
of target management is to recommend acceptance of the offer to 
target shareholders. We exclude takeover bids that do not result in 
  7a takeover, which is defined as occurring when the bidder owns 
less than 50% of the targets shares before the takeover bid, and 
increases its ownership to at least 50% as a result of the bid. We do 
not consider takeovers involving financial and property companies 
because they are subject to special accounting requirements, 
making them difficult to compare with other companies. We 
exclude takeovers if both bidder and target accounting data is not 
held on the Datastream Database for a minimum period of two 
years prior to the takeover. This procedure results in a sample of 
64 hostile takeovers and 139 friendly takeovers. The larger number 
of friendly takeovers reflects the relatively high number of 
uncompleted hostile takeovers. As expected from Fig.1, Panel A of 
Table 1 shows that the sample of hostile and friendly takeovers is 
more heavily concentrated in the 1980s than the 1990s. Of the 64 
hostile takeovers, 42 take place between 1985-89, whilst 22 take 
place between 1990-96. Similarly, of the 139 friendly takeovers, 
96 take place between 1985-89, 43 between 1990-96.  
 
2.2. Methodology  
 
2.2.1. Accounting study methodology 
 
For the accounting study we examine the pre- and post-takeover 
profit returns of bidders and targets, relative to control firms 
matched on industry and size. Barber and Lyon (1996) show that 
profit returns can be determined by industry, or firm specific 
factors such as size, and there is reason to believe that companies 
involved in hostile and friendly takeovers are not equally 
distributed across these different factors. In particular, hostile 
takeovers could take place in poorly performing industries (see, 
e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). Secondly, targets of 
hostile takeovers tend to be large in size (see, e.g., Schwert, 2000). 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the size distribution of sample firms, 
relative to all firms listed on the U.K. stock market. Bidders in 
both hostile and friendly takeovers are relatively large, with over 
  850% being concentrated in the largest two size deciles. However, 
bidders in hostile takeovers are significantly larger than bidders in 
friendly takeovers. Similarly, targets in hostile takeovers are 
relatively large and significantly larger than targets in friendly 
takeovers, which are distributed evenly across the different size 
deciles. Sample firm profit returns are therefore measured relative 
to control firms matched on industry and size, based on the 
methodology suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996). The control 
firms are selected from firms listed on Datastream, which neither 




The profit measure we employ consists of operating profit plus 
other income and extraordinary items before interest paid and 
taxation. Other income is included to capture profits from joint 
ventures, which, if excluded, could cause an upward bias when 
what was previously associate income is consolidated in post-
takeover operating profit. Extraordinary items are added to profits 
because in the U.K. over this period, acquirers could exclude 
integration costs from profit by classifying them as extraordinary 
items. We scale the profit measure by the average of beginning- 
and ending-period book value of assets. Assets are defined as the 
sum of ordinary shareholders funds, long and short term 
borrowing, and preference stock. We use book rather than market 
value of assets because we find strong evidence that investors 
appear to lower their assessment of friendly takeovers in the post-
takeover period. In Section 5.3 we show that friendly takeovers 
result in significantly negative abnormal returns in three of the four 
post-takeover years. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) show that 
this decline in market value could lead to an increase in profit 
returns, even if profits are held constant
11.  
 
We focus our analysis on the three before the takeover (years – 3 
to – 1) and three years following the takeover (years 1 to 3)
12. 
Since nearly all bidders use the acquisition accounting method, we 
  9exclude year 0, the year of the takeover, from the analysis because 
in this year the two firms are consolidated for financial reporting 
purposes only from the takeover completion date. Due to the 
skewness of accounting ratios, we report median values and 





2.2.2. Event study methodology 
 
For the event study, we calculate buy and hold share returns for the 
pre-takeover period, the announcement period, and the post-
takeover period relative to control firms matched on size and book-
to-market. The underlying parameter of interest in this study is the 
long-run performance of sample firms, and we therefore employ 
buy and hold returns rather than cumulative average returns (see 
e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997). Studies 
such as Fama and French (1992) show that the cross sectional 
long-run returns of securities are better explained by size and 
book-to-market than beta. As with size, the book-to-market result 
is of particular importance in the context of this study, since the 
book-to-market of bidders and targets could differ from other 
firms. For example, Schwert (2000) shows that targets in hostile 
bids tend to have higher than average book-to-market, whilst 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) show that bidders tend to be below 
average book-to-market. Panel C in Table 1 shows the distribution 
of book-to-market ratios of bidders and targets, relative to all firms 
listed on the U.K. stock market. Bidders in both hostile and 
friendly takeovers tend to have medium to low book-to-market 
ratios, with 75% concentrated in the smallest six deciles, and do 
not differ significantly from one another. Targets in hostile 
takeovers have significantly higher book-to-market than targets in 
friendly takeovers. Sample firm share returns are therefore 
measured relative to control firms matched on size and book-to-
market, based on the methodology suggested by Barber and Lyon 
  10(1996)
14. We adopt the control firm approach because it avoids the 
skewness and rebalancing biases inherent in a reference portfolio 
approach although it is nevertheless susceptible to the new listing 
bias described by Barber and Lyon (1997). As with the accounting 




Panel D of Table 1 reports the size of targets relative to bidders 
prior to the takeover. The average ratio in hostile takeovers is 0.53, 
whilst the median is 0.24. Therefore our sample of hostile 
takeovers represent significant investments for the bidders 
involved. The ratio is somewhat lower in friendly takeovers, 
however the difference between friendly and hostile takeovers is 
not significant.  
 
3. Pre-takeover performance  
 
If hostile takeovers were carried out for disciplinary motives, then 
we may expect to observe certain pre-takeover performance 
characteristics of target and bidder companies. Specifically, we 
may expect to observe target underperformance, relative to non-
targets, friendly targets, and to bidding companies. In Section 3.1 
we consider the pre-takeover profit returns of target and bidder 
companies in hostile and friendly takeovers, whilst in Section 3.2 
we consider pre-takeover share returns. 
 
3.1. Pre-takeover profit performance 
 
Table 2 reports the pre-takeover abnormal profit return on assets 
for targets and bidders in hostile and friendly takeovers, calculated 
with respect to non-merging control firms matched on industry and 
size. We report the median profit returns for each year – 3, – 2 and 
– 1, for the median annual profit return from – 3 to – 1, and for the 
change in profits from – 2 to –1.  
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three pre-takeover years is insignificantly positive for targets in 
hostile takeovers. There is therefore no sign of long run target 
underperformance in hostile takeovers. The profit returns of targets 
in hostile takeovers deteriorate significantly in the year prior to 
takeover, changing from 3.6% in year – 2 to – 4.6% in year -1. 
This change is statistically significant at the 1% level. The median 
abnormal return in year – 1 is – 4.3%, which is not statistically 
significant (Wilcoxon Z  = – 1.49, t-statistic = – 1.63). The 
abnormal profit returns for targets in friendly takeovers are 
reported in Column 3 of Panel A. These returns are insignificantly 
different from zero for each of the time periods considered, and 
there is no evidence of a deterioration in profit returns as witnessed 
in hostile takeovers.  Column 4 reports the comparison of 
abnormal profits for targets in hostile and friendly takeovers. There 
is little evidence of significant differences in abnormal profit 
levels, although the difference for year –1 (– 4.3% versus 1.0%) 
while insignificant using the Wilcoxon test, is significant using a t-
test at the 10% level (t-statistic = – 1.74). However, the large 
negative change in profits from – 2 to – 1 experienced by targets in 
hostile takeovers is significantly greater than that experienced by 
targets in friendly takeovers. It appears that, although targets in 
hostile takeovers are underperforming compared to their long run 
performance, there is no evidence to suggest that they are 
significantly underperforming compared to non-targets or targets 
in friendly takeovers.  
 
If hostile takeovers are carried out for disciplinary motives, then 
we could expect bidders in hostile takeovers to exhibit above 
average performance. Panel B of Table 2 reports the pre-takeover 
profit returns of bidders. There is no evidence that bidders in 
hostile takeovers experience higher pre-takeover profits than non-
merging firms. The median annual profit returns for years –3 to –1 
earned by bidders in hostile takeovers do not differ significantly 
from those of control firms. Although the difference is large and 
  12positive in year – 1 (3.6%), it is not statistically significant. There 
is no evidence that bidders in friendly takeovers experience 
significantly positive profits over the long run pre-takeover period. 
However, there is some evidence of positive short term abnormal 
profits. In year –1, these bidders experience a positive change 
which is significant at the 5% level, and positive abnormal profits 
which are significant at the 10% level. We compare the abnormal 
profit returns of bidders in hostile and friendly takeovers but find 
no significant differences. In sum, there is little evidence that 
bidders in hostile takeovers experience higher pre-takeover profit 
returns than either control firms or bidders in friendly takeovers.  
 
Although there is little evidence in hostile takeovers of target 
underperformance relative to non-merging firms, perhaps an 
equally relevant comparison is that of targets with their bidders. If 
hostile takeovers are carried out for disciplinary motives, then we 
may expect bidders to earn higher profit returns than their targets, 
after controlling for size and industry differences. Panel C of Table 
2 reports the median difference between the abnormal profit 
returns of bidders and targets. There is no significant difference in 
the median unabnormal returns over years –3 to –1 of bidders and 
targets in either hostile or friendly takeovers. However, the 
difference in year – 1 is significant at the 5% level for hostile 
takeovers but not friendly takeovers. The same is the case for the 
change in profits from year -2 to –1. Therefore, it appears that 
targets in hostile takeovers are performing significantly worse than 
their acquirers in the very short run period prior to takeover. 
Column 4 in Table 2 compares these differences between hostile 
and friendly takeovers. There is no evidence that the difference 
between bidders and targets is significantly different between the 
two types of takeover.    
 
  133.2. Pre-takeover share price performance 
 
Table 3 reports the pre-takeover buy and hold abnormal share 
returns for targets and bidders in hostile and friendly takeovers, 
calculated with respect to control firms matched on size and book-
to-market. We report the returns for each year – 3, – 2 and – 1, and 
from – 3 to – 1. We find for the overall sample evidence of 
positive target share returns starting six months prior to the 
announcement date. This suggests that the market starts to 
anticipate the takeover at this date, and hence year – 1 is the six 
month period lasting from month – 12 to month – 7.  
 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that targets in hostile takeovers 
experience insignificantly negative abnormal returns in years – 3 
and – 2. However, in year – 1, the median abnormal return is –
4.83% and statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the 
median abnormal return from year – 3 to – 1, is – 18.33%, which is 
significant at the 5% level. In contrast, targets in friendly takeovers 
experience abnormal returns that are insignificantly different from 
zero in the pre-takeover period. Column 4 reports the difference in 
abnormal returns of targets in hostile and friendly takeovers. There 
is no significant difference for years – 3 and – 2. However, in year 
– 1, the difference is significant at the 10% level. Therefore, there 
is strong evidence that the short run share price performance of 
targets in hostile takeovers is lower than that of control firms and 
weak evidence that it is lower than that of friendly targets.  
 
Panel B shows that bidders in hostile takeovers earn significant 
abnormal returns in years – 3 and – 2, resulting in a median 
abnormal return from – 3 to – 1 of 19.7%, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The abnormal returns of bidders in 
friendly takeovers are very similar to those in hostile takeovers, 
being significantly positive in years – 2 and – 1, and from – 3 to – 
1. The differences in abnormal returns between bidders in hostile 
and friendly takeovers, shown in column 4, do not differ 
  14significantly for any of the pre-takeover periods. Therefore, 
bidders in both hostile and friendly takeovers appear to perform 
equally well in terms of share returns prior to takeover. It appears 
that bidding companies are superior performers in terms of stock 
price performance. 
 
Panel C reports the comparison of bidders with their targets in 
terms of abnormal returns. The strong performance of bidders in 
both hostile and friendly takeovers results in significant differences 
in both types of bid. In hostile takeovers the difference is 
significantly positive for the periods – 3, – 1, and from – 3 to – 1. 
In friendly takeovers, the difference is significantly positive for – 1 
and from – 3 to – 1. The poorer performance of targets in hostile 
takeovers means that the difference in share returns between bidder 
and target is greater for hostile takeovers than it is for friendly 
takeovers. However, Column 4 shows that these differences are not 
statistically significant. Therefore, the abnormal share returns of 
bidders are significantly higher than those of targets in both hostile 
and friendly takeovers, although not significantly more so in 
hostile takeovers.  
 
Since Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) show that takeovers are 
aimed at poorly performing industries, it is possible that the results 
for targets are driven by industry factors. As a check on the 
robustness of the results, we calculate abnormal share returns using 
the industry- and size-matched non-merging control firms used for 
the abnormal profit calculations. We find that the results are 
qualitatively unchanged. Another potential source of mis-
specification in long-run returns is cross-sectional dependence in 
sample observations (Brav, 1999). This problem is particularly 
relevant to this study, since Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) show 
that takeovers tend to cluster by both time and industry. To 
eliminate the problem of cross-sectional dependence, we employ a 
calendar-time portfolio approach as advocated by Barber, Lyon 
  15and Tsai (1999). However, we find that the results using this 
technique are very similar to those above. 
 
3.3. Summary of findings 
 
To summarise, there is little evidence that targets of hostile 
takeovers have lower pre-takeover profitability than non-merging 
firms or targets in friendly takeovers. This conclusion is consistent 
with previous U.K. and U.S. studies. For example, Franks and 
Mayer (1996) find little evidence of target underperformance in 
hostile takeovers occurring in the U.K. between 1985-86. For the 
U.S., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Martin and McConnell 
(1991), and Schwert (2000), also find little evidence of target 
underperformance prior to hostile takeover. However, we find 
strong evidence that hostile targets experience a deterioration in 
profit returns in the year prior to takeover. This deterioration in 
profits is accompanied by significantly negative share returns in 
the one year prior to takeover. Furthermore, these share returns are 
significantly lower than those experienced by targets in friendly 
takeovers. It appears that in hostile takeovers, targets are slightly 
above average performers experiencing a significant downturn. 
Therefore, the evidence is consistent with targets of hostile 
takeovers being taken over in an attempt to improve performance, 
and in this sense, our evidence may be considered as consistent 
with a disciplinary explanation of hostile takeovers.  
 
We find little evidence that bidders in hostile takeovers are 
superior performers in terms of profitability, compared to either 
non-merging firms or bidders in friendly takeovers. Bidder pre-
takeover performance is much stronger in terms of stock price 
performance than profitability. Bidders in both hostile and friendly 
takeovers experience significantly positive share returns prior to 
the takeover. There are no significant differences between bidders 
in hostile and friendly takeovers, in terms of either profitability or 
share returns.  
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There is evidence that the very short run profit performance of 
bidders is greater than targets in hostile takeovers. In terms of 
stock returns, bidder returns are significantly greater than those 
experienced by targets in both hostile and friendly takeovers. 
Therefore, in hostile takeovers, bidders perform significantly better 
than their targets in terms of both profit and share returns. 
However, there is no evidence that the difference between bidders 
and targets is significantly greater in hostile takeovers than it is in 
friendly takeovers.  
 
We conclude that hostile takeovers involve the acquisition of 
average performing companies experiencing a significant decline 
in performance, by acquirers with strong stock price performance 
although not strong profitability. Alternatively, friendly takeovers 
involve the acquisition of average performing companies by well 
performing companies. This evidence is in one sense consistent 
with the disciplinary hypothesis that hostile takeovers are carried 
out to improve the performance of the target company. However, it 
is hard to argue on the evidence presented that hostile takeovers 
are carried out to reverse the non-value maximizing behavior of 
poorly performing companies. 
 
4. Post-takeover performance 
 
Section 4.1 examines the impact of hostile and friendly takeovers 
on post-takeover profit performance. Section 4.2 examines the 
impact of hostile and friendly takeovers on investment and 
operating characteristics. Section 4.3 examines the impact of 
hostile and friendly takeovers on post-takeover share price 
performance. 
 
4.1. Post-takeover profit performance 
 
  17To examine the effects of takeover, we aggregate performance data 
of the bidder and target firms before the takeover to obtain the pro 
forma pre-takeover performance of the combined firms. 
Comparing the post-takeover performance of the bidder with this 
pre-takeover benchmark provides a measure of the change in 
performance. To correct for the effects of size and industry, we 
calculate abnormal profit returns, which are differences between 
values for the combined firms and values for the weighted-average 
control firms. In the pre-takeover period the weights for the control 
firms are the relative asset size of bidders and targets estimated at 
the beginning of each year, whilst in the post-takeover period the 
weights are the relative asset sizes of bidders and targets in year -1. 
 
Table 4 reports the median abnormal profit returns for hostile and 
friendly takeovers. Hostile takeovers do not have lower pre-
takeover median profit returns than their control firms. There is no 
significant difference between hostile and friendly takeovers in 
terms of pre-takeover abnormal profit returns. Hostile takeovers 
have insignificantly higher profit returns than their control firms in 
the post-takeover period. The median annual return for the sample 
firms in the post-takeover period is 3.1%. Friendly takeovers have 
significantly higher profit returns than their control firms in year 1, 
yet significantly lower profit returns in year 3, and the annual 
median return for the three post-takeover years is – 0.6%. The 
Wilcoxon test for differences between pre- and post-takeover 
median values in hostile takeovers is significant at the 1% level. 
Alternatively, in friendly takeovers, the median annual post-
takeover return is not significantly different from the pre-takeover 
median return. Therefore, in terms of abnormal profit returns, 
hostile takeovers significantly improve performance whereas 
friendly takeovers do not.  
 
The proper post-takeover benchmark must take account of any 
above average high or low pre-takeover performance, otherwise 
some of the difference between pre- and post-takeover 
  18performance could be due to mean reversions that have been 
documented in prior studies (see, e.g., Fama and French, 2000). 
We adopt the methodology employed by Healy, Palepu and 
Ruback (1992), where the effect of takeover is measured as the 
intercept of a cross sectional regression of post-takeover abnormal 
profit returns on the corresponding pre-takeover returns as follows; 
 
PROFPOST  =   +  PROFPRE +   i   (1)  
   
where PROFPOST  is the median annual abnormal profit return on 
assets for the combined firm  from the post-takeover years and 
PROFPRE is the pre-takeover median for the same combined firm. 
Our measure of the effect of takeover on profit returns is the 
intercept   from Eq. (1). The slope coefficient  captures any 
systematic relation in profit returns between the pre and post-
takeover years so that  PROFPRE measures the effect of the pre-
takeover performance on post-takeover returns. The intercept is 
therefore independent of pre-takeover returns.  
 
Table 5 shows that for the sample of hostile takeovers, the estimate 
of  is 0.52, indicating that above average profit returns tend to 
persist over time. The estimate of  is 4.9%, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that there is a 4.9% per 
year increase in post-takeover profit returns after pre-takeover 
performance is controlled for. Therefore, in hostile takeovers, there 
is a significant improvement in the combined firm’s profit returns 
in the post-takeover period. For the sample of friendly takeovers, 
the estimate of  is 0.34, indicating a somewhat smaller persistence 
of profit returns over time compared to hostile takeovers. The 
estimate of  is an insignificantly negative 0.7%, indicating that 
friendly takeovers have an insignificant impact on profit returns. 
To test whether the impact of takeover on profit differs 
significantly between hostile and friendly takeovers, we estimate 
Eq. (1) for the sample of both hostile and friendly takeovers, and 
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is hostile, zero if friendly. Column 5 shows that the coefficient for 
MOOD is 5.2%, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
These results indicate that hostile takeovers have a significantly 
large positive effect on profit performance, and this effect is 
significantly greater than that observed in friendly takeovers.   
 
We introduce additional independent variables into the regression 
to determine whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of 
other factors that have been advanced as both important 
determinants of takeover performance, and associated with the 
mood of the takeover. PAYMENT  is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the method of payment includes a 100% cash 
alternative, zero otherwise. Since cash bids have generally been 
shown in the literature to be associated with good performance 
(Loughran and Vijh, 1997), the significantly positive impact of 
hostility may not hold once we control for the method of payment. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) argue that managers can 
entrench themselves by carrying out diversifying takeovers, and 
show that such takeovers are value destructive. We therefore 
include a dummy variable, HORIZ, which equals one if the bidder 
and target are in the same two digit SIC, and zero otherwise. Rau 
and Vermaelen (1997) show that MTBV has a significantly 
negative effect on takeover performance, and we therefore include 
MTBV as a control variable. Since the relative size of target to 
bidder is relatively large in hostile takeovers, we include it 
(RELSIZE) as an explanatory variable, which measures the market 
valuation of the target compared to the bidder at the end of the 
financial year prior to takeover.  
 
Regressions (2) and (4) in Table 5 report the effect of these 
variables on profitability in hostile and friendly takeovers 
separately. In hostile takeovers RELSIZE is significantly positive, 
whereas it is insignificantly negative in friendly takeovers. 
PAYMENT does not have a significant effect on profitability in 
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significantly positive. Regression (6) pools the samples of hostile 
and friendly takeovers together. The results show that the MOOD 
coefficient is no longer statistically significant when the other 
variables are included. This is partly the result of the significantly 
positive correlation with cash. The PAYMENT coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, consistent with 
Linn and Switzer (2001). The correlation between PAYMENT and 
MOOD is statistically significant and it is possible that the 
improvement in hostile acquisitions may be due to this correlation. 
We find that MTBV, HORIZONTAL and RELSIZE all have an 
insignificant impact on takeover profitability in the pooled sample.  
 
We carry out diagnostic checking for the regressions in Table 5. 
We test for serial correlation using the Durbin-Watson statistic, 
and cannot reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation. Using Eigenvalues, we find no evidence of 
multicollinearity between our explanatory variables. However, 
using the Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity, we reject at 
the 1% level the null hypothesis that regressions (3) to (6) do not 
suffer from heteroscedasticity. Since the least squares estimates are 
inefficient and the estimates of variances are biased under 
heteroscedasticity, we investigate the problem further. We firstly 
examine whether the heteroscedasticity is caused by extreme 
observations, by excluding multivariate outliers according to the 
Hadi technique. This technique results in the exclusion of 3 
friendly takeover observations. Their exclusion results in identical 
regression results, except that we cannot now reject the hypothesis 
of no heteroscedasticity at the 5% level. We conclude that the 
heteroscedasticity is caused by these extreme observations and that 
our results are robust upon their exclusion.  
 
We conclude that hostile takeovers result in a significant 
improvement in profitability, whereas friendly takeovers do not. 
Hostile takeovers result in significantly higher profitability, but 
  21this appears to be the result of a positive correlation with cash 
payment than hostility per se. When we control for the method of 
payment, hostility no longer has a significant impact on 
profitability.  
 
4.2. Components of post-takeover profit returns  
 
The profit improvement in hostile takeovers can arise from a 
variety of sources, as discussed in the introduction. These include 
improvements at the operating level, in the form of improvements 
in operating margins, or greater asset productivity. One of the ways 
in which operating margins can be increased is through cutting 
costs, one important component of which is labour costs. Shleifer 
and Summers (1988), argue that hostile takeovers can lower labour 
costs since they present the opportunity to renegotiate explicit and 
implicit labour contracts. Alternatively, profit increases could be 
achieved by selling off poorly performing assets, or by reducing 
inefficient investment. In this section, we provide evidence on 
which of these sources contribute to the profit increase in hostile 
takeovers.   
 
The operating profit return on assets can be decomposed into profit 
margin on sales and asset turnover. The former measures the 
operating profit generated per unit of sales whilst the latter 
measures the sales generated from each unit of assets. Table 6 
shows that the operating profit increase in hostile takeovers is 
attributable to an increase in operating margins rather than asset 
turnover. In years – 3 to – 1, the combined firms have abnormal 
median profit margins of – 0.1%, which increases to 0.3% in years 
1 to 3. The intercept in the cross sectional regression is 2.1% and 
statistically significant. There is no evidence that hostile takeovers 
result in higher asset turnover. In contrast to hostile takeovers, 
friendly takeovers do not result in higher operating margins. The 
intercept in the cross sectional regression is – 0.2% and statistically 
insignificant. Panel C shows that the difference in the effect of 
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takeovers than in friendly takeovers. The evidence thus indicates 
that there is a significant improvement in profit margins following 
hostile takeovers, but not friendly takeovers.  
 
To assess whether the profit margin improvements in hostile 
takeovers are the result of reductions in either the number of 
employees or their remuneration, Table 6 reports the employee 
growth rate and the average employment cost per employee. In 
hostile takeovers, the median growth rate in employees is 1.1% in 
years – 3 to – 1, and – 4.6% in years 1 to 3.  The post-takeover 
employee growth rate is significantly lower than that of control 
firms. However, the intercept in the cross sectional regression is 
not statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of hostile 
takeovers on employee growth rates is not significant. The results 
for friendly takeovers are very similar
16. This evidence is 
consistent with the evidence of Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) 
who find that employment redundancies are not the dominant 
source of hostile takeover gains. There is no significant effect on 
the average employment cost per employee in either hostile or 
friendly takeovers. In hostile takeovers, the regression intercept 
indicates that post-takeover, employment costs fall by £68, which 
is statistically insignificant. Alternatively, in friendly takeovers, 
average employment costs rise by £264, which is also 
insignificant. This evidence suggests that labour cost reductions 
are unlikely to drive the profit improvements in hostile takeovers.  
 
The operating margin improvements in hostile takeovers could be 
achieved by selling off poorly performing assets. We therefore 
examine cash proceeds from asset sales in the pre- and post-
takeover years. Table 6 shows that the median cash proceeds from 
asset sales for the combined firms before and after hostile 
takeovers are 1.3% and 1.4% of total assets. Both of these rates are 
significantly higher than the rates for the control firms. Further, 
controlling for the level of pre-takeover asset disposals, there is an 
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Alternatively, there is no evidence of increased asset disposals 
following friendly takeovers. Panel C shows that the asset 
disposals following hostile takeovers are significantly higher than 
those in friendly takeovers
17.  
 
Table 6 also reports the rate of capital expenditures to assets in the 
pre- and post-takeover years. The median capital expenditures as a 
percentage of assets in hostile takeovers is 7.1% in the pre-
takeover period and 5.6% in the post-takeover period, neither of 
which are significantly different from those of nonmerging firms. 
The intercept in the cross sectional regression is not statistically 
significant, suggesting that the effect of hostile takeovers on capital 
expenditure is not significant. Similarly, in friendly takeovers the 
capital expenditures of the sample firms are no different from 
nonmerging firms in either the pre- or post-takeover period. There 
is no difference between hostile and friendly takeovers in terms of 
capital expenditure changes.  
 
In summary, the improvement in profit returns in the three years 
following hostile takeovers arises from improved operating profit 
margins and not increased asset productivity. The improvement in 
margins does not come at the expense of employees, since there is 
no evidence of decreased labour costs or layoffs following hostile 
takeovers. Hostile takeovers do not result in a reduction in capital 
expenditures. However, there is evidence of increased asset 
disposals following hostile takeovers.  
 
4.3. Post-takeover share price performance   
 
This section considers the effect of hostile and friendly takeovers 
on the shareholder wealth of the bidder and target firms. We 
estimate buy and hold share returns over the announcement period 
and the four year period following the completion date, for both 
sample firms and size- and book-to-market matched control firms.  
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Panel A of Table 7 shows that the median announcement abnormal 
return earned by targets in hostile takeovers is 41.9%, which is 
significantly higher than the median abnormal return of 28.2% 
earned by targets in friendly takeovers.  The median abnormal 
return in hostile takeovers is an insignificant – 0.2, compared to 
1.1% in friendly takeovers. To investigate whether the total gains 
to both bidder and target shareholders are positive, we examine the 
combined abnormal returns which are the weighted average 
abnormal returns for both bidder and target, with the weights being 
the relative market values at the start of the announcement period. 
The combined announcement returns are significantly positive in 
both friendly and hostile takeovers, being 9.1% and 5.0% 
respectively. The difference of 4.1% between hostile and friendly 
takeovers is not statistically significant. The market’s assessment 
of hostile takeovers at announcement appears consistent with the 
subsequent improvement in profit returns. However, the positive 
announcement period share returns in friendly takeovers appear at 
odds with the subsequent neutral profit effects reported in Section 
4.1.  
 
Panel B of Table 7 shows that over the four-year period following 
the completion date, the median abnormal return earned by bidders 
in hostile takeovers is – 4.0%, which is statistically insignificant. 
In contrast, the median abnormal return in friendly takeovers is 
only – 22.1%, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
difference in post-takeover median abnormal returns between 
hostile and friendly takeovers is significant at the 10% level. Panel 
C reports the buy and hold returns over both the announcement and 
post-takeover periods to establish the overall returns to 
shareholders. Bidder shareholders in hostile takeovers experience 
insignificant returns of –7.4, whilst bidders in friendly takeovers 
experience negative abnormal returns of – 16.6%, significant at the 
5% level. The combined abnormal return over both time periods 
consists of the weighted average of the target announcement 
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return is 5.4%, which is statistically insignificant. Alternatively, in 
friendly takeovers, the return is a significantly negative – 9.3%.  
 
One possible explanation for the negative share returns in friendly 
takeovers is that the stock market reacts negatively to new 
information regarding the profitability of the takeover which only 
comes to light in the post-takeover period. To investigate this, we 
consider whether the post-takeover abnormal share returns are 
correlated with the profit effects of takeover, by estimating Eq. (1) 
including the post-takeover abnormal returns as an independent 
variable. The coefficient for this variable in the friendly takeover 
sample is 0.04, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
contrast, for the hostile takeover sample the coefficient is an 
insignificant – 0.01.  
 
Another possibility is that the post-takeover negative returns are 
driven by variables not controlled for in our counterfactual 
measure. In particular, Barber, Lyon and Tsai (1999) show that 
when sample firms differ from the population in terms of prior 
performance or industry factors, biased inferences can result when 
such factors are not controlled for. In Section 3.2, it was shown 
that bidders experience above average pre-takeover share returns, 
and therefore the post-takeover negative returns could represent 
reversals in share returns that are not the result of takeover itself. 
We consider whether the negative post-takeover returns are the 
result of mean reversions in share returns by examining the 
correlation between pre- and post-takeover abnormal returns. The 
correlation coefficients between the 36 month pre-takeover 
abnormal returns and the 48 month post-takeover abnormal returns 
for friendly and hostile takeovers are 0.083 (p-value = 0.36) and – 
0.03 (p-value = 0.83) respectively. To check for industry effects 
we carry out the same analysis using the share returns of the non-
merging size and industry matched control firms. However, the 
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market-control firms.  
 
Another potential source of mis-specification in long-run returns is 
cross-sectional dependence in sample observations (Brav, 1999). 
To eliminate the problem of cross-sectional dependence, we 
employ a calendar-time portfolio approach as advocated by Barber, 
Lyon and Tsai (1999). We form portfolios of bidder firms and their 
control firms over the entire period of the study (January 1985 
through March 1999). Each bidder and control firm is added to the 
portfolio in the month following completion and is kept in the 
portfolio for 48 months or until the firm ceases trading. We 
estimate average abnormal monthly returns for each month of the 
study, and an average abnormal monthly return for the entire 
period. Inference is based on a t-statistic derived from the time-
series of the monthly calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns. For 
bidders in hostile takeovers, the monthly calendar-time portfolio 
abnormal return is –0.004% (t-statistic = -0.01). For bidders in 
friendly takeovers the return is –0.62% (t-statistic = -2.52), which 
is statistically significant at the 5% level.  However, the difference 
between the two returns is not statistically significant.  
 
As with profitability, the possibility exists that the effect of 
hostility on post-takeover share returns is the result of a correlation 
with another variable. To examine this we regress the post-
acquisition returns on MOOD, PAYMENT, MTBV, 
HORIZONTAL, and RELSIZE. The results in Table 8 show that 
none of these variables have a significant impact on returns in 
either hostile or friendly acquisitions. However, regression (3) 
shows that when these variables are included in a regression, the 
coefficient of MOOD is not significant.  
 
In summary, the evidence presented in this section indicates that 
both hostile and friendly takeovers create significant value for 
target shareholders at announcement, whilst bidder shareholders 
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hostile takeovers result in mildly negative abnormal returns, whilst 
friendly takeovers result in significantly negative returns. 
However, the significant difference between hostile and friendly 
takeovers does not hold when we control for factors such as the 
method of payment.  
 
4.4 Summary of findings  
 
To summarize, hostile takeovers result in a significant 
improvement in profit returns, whilst friendly takeovers do not. 
Our results for the U.K. stand in contrast to the results of Healy, 
Palepu and Ruback (1997) who find that friendly takeovers 
significantly improve profitability whilst hostile takeovers do not. 
We find that hostile takeovers are associated with an increase in 
profit margins but not an increase in asset turnover. Hostile 
takeovers are associated with significant asset disposals, but not 
with significant reductions in employee numbers, remuneration or 
investment. The high level of asset disposals is consistent with 
previous studies such as Bhide (1989), Bhagat, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990), and Franks and Meyer (1996), that report 
significant asset disposals following hostile takeovers. The finding 
that hostile takeovers do not result in a reduction in investment is 
consistent with the evidence reported by Bhagat, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990), and Bhide (1989). During the takeover 
announcement period, shareholder wealth gains to targets in both 
hostile and friendly takeovers are significantly large, although the 
gains are significantly larger in hostile takeovers. This is consistent 
with the evidence of Franks and Mayer (1996), who find 
significantly larger bid premiums in hostile takeovers. There is no 
difference in the announcement returns of bidders in hostile and 
friendly takeovers, which experience zero abnormal returns. The 
combined returns in both hostile and friendly takeovers are 
significantly positive and not significantly different from one 
another. The long run post-takeover abnormal share returns in 
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Alternatively, friendly takeovers result in significantly negative 
post-takeover share returns which outweigh the announcement 
returns and result in significantly negative overall returns.  
 
5. The relation between post-takeover performance and target 
pre-takeover performance 
 
The results presented in Sections 3 and 4 are not fully supportive 
of the disciplinary hypothesis that hostile takeovers are carried out 
because of poor target performance, which is subsequently 
improved in the post-takeover period. Another conjecture of the 
disciplinary theory is that the worse the pre-bid performance of the 
target, the bigger the potential improvement by shifting the target 
performance towards best practice.  
 
Table 9 reports the results of regressions including measures of 
takeover performance as the dependent variable and three different 
measures of target pre-acquisition performance as the explanatory 
variables. The measures of target performance are the abnormal 
profit in year –1, the change in abnormal profit from year –2 to 
year –1, and the abnormal share return in the year –1. Panel A 
models the post-takeover profit returns as the dependent variable. 
In hostile takeovers, the coefficient for target profit in year –1 is 
negative but statistically insignificant. The coefficient for the 
change in profits is actually significantly positive, whilst the 
coefficient for target share returns is insignificantly positive. 
Therefore there is little evidence that in hostile takeovers, the 
worse the target performance, the better the profit performance of 
the acquisition.   In panel B we model the combined announcement 
returns as the dependent variable. The coefficients for the target 
performance are insignificant for each measure, and of conflicting 
signs. Similar results are found in Panel B, where the post-
acquisition bidder returns are modelled as the dependent variable. 
In sum, there is no evidence that hostile takeover performance is 
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company. Similar results are found for the sample of friendly 
takeovers.   
 
According to the disciplinary hypothesis, the significant increase in 
asset disposals following hostile takeovers could be expected to be 
greater, the worse the pre-takeover performance of the target. In a 
separate analysis we examine the correlation between the change 
in asset disposals and the three measures of target pre-acquisition 
performance described above. We find no evidence of a negative 
correlation between the two variables. 
 
To summarize, there is no evidence that in hostile takeovers, the 
post-takeover profit performance of the combined firms is 
negatively related to the pre-takeover profit performance of the 
target. The same is true in friendly takeovers. This finding is 
inconsistent with the evidence of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 
(1989), and Servaes (1991), who find that total announcement 
returns are significantly higher in takeovers involving low q 
targets. Our evidence is inconsistent with the disciplinary 
hypothesis, which predicts that the degree of performance 
improvement and wealth creation following takeover is higher, the 
worse the pre-takeover performance of the target.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
This paper examines whether hostile takeovers perform a 
disciplinary function by taking over poorly performing companies 
and improving their performance. Evidence comes from a 
comprehensive sample of hostile takeovers between U.K. public 
industrial firms completed in the period 1985 to mid-1996. We 
employ accounting and share return data to examine the 
performance of targets and bidders before the takeover, and the 
combined firm following the takeover. We find little evidence of 
relative underperformance by targets of hostile takeovers. 
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profits and share returns in the year of acquisition.   
 
In the post-takeover period, there is clear evidence that the 
performance of combined firms improves following hostile 
takeovers. Profitability is enhanced, announcement share returns 
are positive and long run share returns are not significantly 
negative. In contrast, friendly takeovers do not improve 
performance in the post-takeover period, and result in significantly 
negative share returns in the long run period following the 
takeover. The wealth gains in hostile takeovers do not appear to 
come at the expense of employees or reductions in investment, but 
are instead associated with significant asset disposals. However, 
the superior performance of hostile takeovers does not hold when 
the method of payment is taken into account, and it appears that 
this performance may be the result of a correlation with cash 
acquisitions. 
 
We examine whether the performance of hostile takeovers is 
related to the pre-acquisition performance of the target company. 
However, we find no evidence to suggest that this is the case.  
 
Taken together, these findings suggest that friendly takeovers 
appear to be a manifestation of managerial failure in the bidder, 
and should be viewed with some degree of scepticism by bidder 
shareholders. However, the findings on hostile takeovers provide 
little evidence that the U.K. market for corporate control functions 
as an effective disciplinary device for underperforming companies.  
  31Notes 
 
1  See, e.g., Martin and McConnell (1991), Franks and Mayer     
(1996), and Schwert (2000). 
 
2   See, e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). 
 
3      See, e.g., Franks and Mayer (1996), and Schwert (2000). 
 
4   See, e.g., Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Herman and         
Lowenstein (1988), and Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1997).  
 
5     See, e.g., Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Bhide (1989),  
and Franks and Mayer (1996). 
 
6    There is also strong evidence of  high  target  management     
turnover following hostile takeovers (Martin and McConnell, 
1991). 
 
7     Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989), and Servaes (1991) find 
that shareholder wealth gains are significantly higher in 
takeovers involving low q targets and high q bidders.  
 
8   It is of note that although hostile bids account for a minority 
of bids in terms of number, in terms of bid value they account 
for the majority of U.K. takeover bids. From 1985-95, the 
real (1998) value of hostile bids was £251 billion, whereas 
the real value of friendly takeovers bids was £214 billion. 
 
9    Compared to the U.S., in the U.K. there are fewer 
antitakeover provisions enshrined in either corporate charters 
or state legislation. For example, the Takeover Code in the 
U.K. explicitly prevents the application of poison pills once a 
takeover bid has been launched.   
  3210   The control firms are selected by first matching each sample 
firm to all non-merging firms in the same Datastream 
industrial classification (equivalent to a two-digit SIC code). 
Secondly, to match on size, we select the potential control 
firm with the book value of assets closest to sample firms’ 
asset size in the year prior to takeover. 
 
11    U.S. studies (see, e.g., Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992) 
employ the market rather than book value of assets as the 
denominator because the presence of goodwill and positive 
write-ups to fair values is likely to bias downwards 
accounting return on book asset measures.  However, unlike 
their U.S. counterparts, over the time period of this study 
U.K. companies did not have to carry goodwill in the balance 
sheet and amortize it against income. Instead, they were able 
to immediately write off the goodwill against equity reserves 
in the balance sheet and so avoid diluting reported earnings 
with goodwill amortization. This gives a result which, save 
for the restatement of acquired assets at fair values, is 
substantially the same as pooling accounting. Consequently, 
U.K. companies have almost invariably chosen the write-off 
option, and unlike the U.S., write-ups to fair values have very 
infrequently been positive in the U.K. (Higson, 1998). 
Therefore, the downward bias observed in the U.S. does not 
appear to exist in the U.K. 
 
12   The results are qualitatively unchanged when we extend the 
analysis to 4 years. 
 
13   Barber and Lyon (1996) show empirically that this statistic is 
uniformly more powerful than any parametric t-statistic. We 
also carry out the following analysis using mean measures 
and parametric t-tests. Unless otherwise stated, the results are 
qualitatively similar. 
 
  3314    The control firms are selected by first dividing all U.K. 
stocks listed on Datastream into 50 equal sized portfolios 
based on their market values at the beginning of each 
calendar year. Secondly, each sample firm is then matched 
with the firm from its size portfolio which has the closest 
book-to-market. This procedure is repeated for each calendar 
year pre- and post-takeover. If a control firm dies within the 
year, we replace the returns from the month of exit with the 
returns of the next nearest firm in terms of book-to-market 
within the particular size portfolio. If this control firm 
subsequently dies then we use the next closest firm, and so 
on. 
 
15   Barber and Lyon (1997) show empirically that the size- and 
book-to-market control firm method yields well-specified 
Wilcoxon test statistics in all sampling situations analyzed. 
We also carry out the analysis using mean measures and 
parametric  t-tests. Unless otherwise stated, the results are 
qualitatively similar. 
 
16    We also examine the effect of hostile takeovers on the 
number of employees and find similar results. The regression 
intercept is negative but once again statistically insignificant. 
 
17    We also examine the effect of takeover on cash proceeds 
from sales of disposals of share stakes (excluding associated 
companies and subsidiaries). These proceeds account for a 
smaller proportion of total assets than those from sales of 
assets. However, the results are identical to those for asset 
disposals. 
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This graph shows the number of takeover bids made for U.K. targets listed on the 
U.K. Stock Exchange, and the number and percentage of which are hostile. Hostile 
takeover bids are defined as those that are rejected initially by the target 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for hostile and friendly takeovers 
completed between January 1985 and June 1996  
 
Panel A reports the distribution by year of hostile takeovers and friendly takeovers made 
by U.K. public firms for U.K. public firms. Takeovers are classified as hostile if the 
target board’s initial reaction is to recommend target shareholders to reject the offer or 
friendly if the initial reaction is to recommend acceptance. The takeovers are those in 
which the bidder and target are covered by the Datastream database. Panel B reports the 
distribution of size decile rankings of bidder and targets. Size deciles are computed at the 
end of the calendar year prior to the year of announcement for all U.K. listed firms. 
Decile 1 is the smallest. Panel C reports the distribution of book-to-market decile 
rankings, where book-to-market deciles are similarly computed at the end of year prior to 
the announcement year for all U.K. listed firms. Panel D reports the sizes of targets 
relative to bidders at the end of the month prior to the month of announcement. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of takeover years 
Years   Hostile  takeovers    Friendly 
takeovers 
 
    Number   Percent of total   Number   Percent of total 
1985   11  17.2   16  11.5 
1986   9  14.1   27  19.4 
1987   7  10.9   24  17.3 
1988   8  12.5   21  15.1 
1989   7  10.9   8  5.8 
1990   5  7.8   8  5.8 
1991   6  9.4   15  10.8 
1992   1  1.6   2  1.4 
1993   3  4.7   3  2.2 
1994   2  3.1   6  4.3 
1995   3  4.7   9  6.5 
1996   2  3.1   0  0.0 
Total   64  100.0   139  100.0 
Panel B: Size deciles of bidder and target prior to the announcement of the takeover 
b 
Size  decile   Hostile  takeovers    Friendly 
takeovers 
 
   Bidders  Targets   Bidders  Targets 
1-2     1    (1.6%)   7 (10.9%)      9   (6.5%)  22 (15.8%) 
3-4    10 (15.6%)   6   (9.4%)    10   (7.2%)  33 (23.7%) 
5-6     6    (9.4%)  10 (15.6%)    17 (12.2%)  31 (22.3%) 
7-8    10 (15.6%)  13 (20.3%)    33 (23.7%)  30 (21.6%) 
9-10    37 (57.8%)  28 (43.8%)    70 (50.4%)  23 (16.5%) 
Total   64  64   139  139 
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 Hostile  takeovers    Friendly 
takeovers 
 
   Bidders  Targets   Bidders  Targets 
1-2    13 (20.3%)   7  (10.9%)    34 (24.5%)  21 (15.1%) 
3-4    21 (32.8%)  20 (31.3%)    42 (30.2%)  40 (28.8%) 
5-6    16 (25.0%)  14 (21.9%)    31 (22.3%)  33 (23.7%) 
7-8     9  (14.1%)  15 (23.4%)    19 (13.7%)  22 (15.8%) 
9-10     5    (7.8%)   8  (12.5%)    13   (9.4%)  23 (16.5%) 
Total   64  64   139  139 
Average 
(median) 
  5.63 (1.79)  2.05 (1.41)      3.13 (1.74)  2.68 (1.82) 
Panel D: Sizes of targets relative to bidders prior to the announcement of the takeover  
d 
   Hostile  takeovers    Friendly 
takeovers 
 
Average   0.531     0.365   
Maximum   7.213     4.625   
Minimum   0.008     0.001   
Median   0.240     0.203   
a The market capitalization values of the targets are in billions of sterling, deflated using the 
FTSE All Share Index with 1998 as the base year. 
b Using the Mann Whitney test, the null hypothesis that the two types of bidder have the same 
median size can be rejected at the 5% level. Hostile bidders are larger than friendly bidders. 
Using the Mann Whitney test, the null hypothesis that the two types of target have the same 
median size can be rejected at the 1% level. Hostile targets are larger than friendly targets. 
 
c Using the Mann Whitney test, the null hypothesis that the two types of bidder have the same 
median book-to-market cannot be rejected at the 5% level. Using the Mann Whitney test, the null 
hypothesis that the two types of target have the same median book-to-market can be rejected at 
the 5% level. Hostile targets have lower book-to-market than friendly targets. 
d Using the Mann Whitney test, the null hypothesis that the two types of takeover have the same median 
ratio of relative size of target to bidder cannot be rejected at the 5% level.  
 
 
  38Table 2  The pre-takeover profit returns of targets and bidders in hostile and 
friendly takeovers 
 
This table reports the abnormal target and bidder median profit returns for each of the 
three pre-takeover years where – 1 is the last accounting year prior to the bid. The change 
in profit returns between – 1 and – 2 is also reported. The control firms are industry- and 
size-matched non-merging firms. Profit is measured as operating profit plus other income 
and extraordinary items, divided by the average of beginning- and ending-period book 
value of assets. Non-parametric significance levels for tests in difference in medians are 
based on the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.  
 
Year relative to takeover    Hostile (N=64)  Friendly (N=139)  Hostile vs. Friendly 
Panel A: Targets         
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Panel C: Panel A vs. 
Panel B 
      










































Table 3  The pre-takeover share returns of targets and bidders 
in hostile and friendly takeovers 
 
The figures in this table are median buy and hold share returns for bidders and targets for 
years – 3, – 2, and – 1 where year – 3 starts 36 months prior to the month of the takeover 
announcement. Year – 1 is the six month period from month – 12 to month – 7. The 
control firms are matched on size and book-to-market. Non-parametric significance 
levels for tests in difference in medians are based on the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.  
 
Year relative to takeover    Hostile(N=64)  Friendly (N=139)  Hostile vs. Friendly 
Panel A: Targets         



























Panel B: Bidders          






























Panel C: Panel A vs. 
Panel B 
      




































  40Table 4  The post-takeover profit returns of hostile and 
friendly takeovers  
 
This table reports the effect of the takeover on abnormal profit returns, computed with 
reference to non-merging industry- and size-matched control firms. Profit is measured as 
operating profit plus other income and extraordinary items, divided by the average of 
beginning- and ending-period book value of assets. Pre-takeover returns for the combined 
firm are weighted averages of bidder and target returns, with the weights being the 






 Hostile  vs. 
Friendly 














– 3  55  – 1.4% 
 c  97  –  0.1%     
– 2  58  0.1    109  – 2.1     
– 1  58  – 1.3    123  0.0     
Median annual 
profit for years – 3 











              
1 58  1.4    123  2.5   
 c    
2 54  3.6    113  0.2     
3  47  – 0.4    99  – 3.4
 b    
Median annual 













              
Median difference 














a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively, using a two 
tailed test 
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  42Table 5  The post-takeover profit returns of hostile and 
friendly takeovers  
 
This table reports the effect of the takeover on abnormal profit returns, computed with 
reference to non-merging industry- and size-matched control firms. Profit is measured as 
operating profit plus other income and extraordinary items, divided by the average of 
beginning- and ending-period book value of assets. Pre-takeover returns for the combined 
firm are weighted averages of bidder and target returns, with the weights being the 
relative asset values of the two firms. The dependent variable is the median adjusted 
profit for the three-year post-takeover period, PROFPRE is the median adjusted profit for 
the three-year pre-takeover period. MOOD is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
takeover is hostile, zero if friendly. PAYMENT is a dummy variable which equals one if 
the method of payment includes a 100% cash alternative. MTBV is the MTBV of the 
bidder at the last accounting year prior to takeover. HORIZONTAL is a dummy variable 
which equals one if the takeover is horizontal, defined as being in the same 2-digit SIC. 
RELSIZE is the market valuation of the target divided by the market valuation of the 






Hostile takeovers  Friendly takeovers  All takeovers 






































PAYMENT   0.0356 
(0.98) 
  0.0632 
c 
(1.97) 
  0.0594 
b 
(2.38) 
MTBV   0.0005 
(0.85) 
  0.0067 
c 
(1.93) 
  0.0010 
(1.30) 
HORIZONTAL   -0.0126 
-(0.35) 
  -0.0022 
(-0.06) 
  -0.0075 
-(0.29) 
RELSIZE   0.0391 
b 
(2.32) 
  -0.0013 
(-0.15) 
  0.0031 
(0.40) 
F-statistic  16.40 4.89 13.09 4.24 13.74 5.79 
p-value  (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Adjusted R
2  0.21 0.25 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.14 
N  58  58  123 123 181 181 
  43a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively, using a two tailed test 
 
  44Table 6  The post-takeover operating and investment 
characteristics of hostile and friendly takeovers  
 
Operating profit margin is defined as; operating profit + extraordinary items / sales. Asset turnover is 
defined as sales / total assets. Employment costs consist of wages, salaries, and pension contributions. 
Number of employees is the total number, including part time workers. Asset disposal rate is defined as; 
cash receipts from fixed asset sales / total assets at beginning of year. Capital expenditure rate is defined as 
capital expenditures / total assets at beginning of year. The figures in column 4 of Panels A and B are the 
estimated intercepts from regressing post-takeover abnormal performance (POST)  on pre-takeover 
abnormal performance (PRE), where pre- (post-takeover) performance is the median of the three-year pre-
takeover (post-takeover) period. Panel C reports the results of this regression, calculated for the sample of 
both hostile and friendly takeovers. MOOD is a dummy variable that equals one if the takeover is hostile 
and zero if the takeover is friendly. t-values are in parentheses. Abnormal values are computed with 
reference to non-merging industry- and size-matched control firms. Pre-takeover measures for the 
combined firm are weighted averages of bidder and target returns, with the weights being the relative sizes 
of the two firms.  
 





Variable     Pre-takeover  Post-takeover       
Panel A: Hostile takeovers               
Operating profit margin     – 0.1  0.3    2.1
 c 58 
Asset turnover     0.05x  – 0.01x    – 0.06x  57 
Employee growth rate      0.2%  – 6.3% 
a   –  2.6%  52 
Employment costs per 
employee  
   – £324.7  – £157.4    – £68.0  55 
Asset disposal rate      0.4
 a 0.8
 a   1.0
 b 56 
Capital expenditure rate     – 0.2  – 0.1    – 1.0  56 
Panel B: Friendly takeovers               
Operating profit margin     0.7  1.2    – 0.19  121 
Asset turnover     – 0.01x  – 0.1x
 b   –  0.1x  123 
Employee growth rate     0.0%  – 3.0%
 c   –  1.9%  117 
Employment costs per 
employee  
  –  £194.6  £6.6    £264.2  120 
Asset disposal rate      0.5
 a 0.4
 a   0.0  122 
Capital expenditure rate     0.0  0.0    – 1.0  121 
Panel C:  Difference between hostile and friendly takeovers  
Dependent variable (POST)  Intercept  Independent variables  F-statistic R
2 N 
   PRE  MOOD       
Operating profit margin  – 0.002  0.444
 a 0.022
 c 30.9
 a 0.25  183
Asset turnover  – 0.055  0.711
 a 0.008  120.9
 a 0.58  180
Employee growth rate   – 0.019  – 0.003  – 0.007  0.3  0.00  169
Employment costs per 
employee  
0.264 1.232
 a –  0.334  679.7
 a 0.89  169
Asset disposal rate   0.001  0.164
 a 0.008
 c 6.6
 a 0.07  178
Capital expenditure rate  – 0.010  0.531
 a 0.008  25.2
 a 0.23  177
a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively, using a two tailed test 
 
 
  45Table 7  The announcement and post-takeover share returns of 
hostile and friendly takeovers (in %) 
 
This table reports median buy and hold share returns for bidders and targets for the 
announcement and post-takeover periods. The announcement period lasts from the 
beginning of the announcement month to the end of the month of completion. The post-
takeover period lasts from the end of the month of completion to 4 years afterwards. The 
abnormal share returns are computed with reference to control firms matched on size and 
book-to-market. The combined abnormal return is the weighted average return of the 
bidder and target abnormal returns, with the weights being the relative market values of 
the two firms. Non-parametric significance levels for tests in difference in medians are 








Panel A: Announcement period 























Panel B: Post-takeover period
 a 








Panel C: Announcement and post-takeover period 
















Hostile takeovers earn median annual abnormal returns of 8.9%, – 5.4%, 13.7%, – 1.6% during years 1 to year 4. 
Friendly takeovers earn median annual abnormal returns of – 4.2% 
c, – 6.3% 
d, 0.2%, – 5.6
 % 
b during years 1 to year 4. 
a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% 
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Table 8  Regression of post-takeover share returns on the 
mood of the takeover and other variables (in %) 
 
The dependent variable is the 4 year median buy-and-hold share returns for bidders from 
the end of the month of completion to 4 years afterwards. The abnormal share returns are 
computed with reference to control firms matched on size and book-to-market. MOOD is 
a dummy variable which equals one if the takeover is hostile, zero if friendly. 
PAYMENT is a dummy variable which equals one if the method of payment includes a 
100% cash alternative. MTBV is the MTBV of the bidder at the last accounting year prior 
to takeover. HORIZONTAL is a dummy variable which equals one if the takeover is 
horizontal, defined as being in the same 2-digit SIC. RELSIZE is the market valuation of 
the target divided by the market valuation of the bidder at the last accounting year prior to 
takeover. t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
  SAMPLE 
  Hostile takeovers  Friendly takeovers  All takeovers 
  (1) (2) (4) 






MOOD     0.2867 
(1.27) 



























F-statistic 1.22  0.57  1.69 
p-value (0.3140)  (0.6870)  (0.1390) 
Adjusted R
2  0.02 -0.02 0.02 
N 58  123  181 
a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% 
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  48Table 9  Cross sectional regressions of takeover performance 
on the pre-takeover performance of the target 
In Panel A the dependent variable is the median abnormal annual profit return for the three year 
post-takeover period. PROFPRE is the median abnormal annual profit return for the three year 
pre-takeover period. ADPROF t-1 is the target abnormal profitability in year –1. ADCHANGE is 
the change in target abnormal profit from year –2 to –1. ADBHAR t-1 is the target buy-and-hold 
abnormal return from month –12 to month –6. In Panel B the dependent variable is the 
announcement period combined returns to bidders and targets. In Panel C, the dependent variable 
is the post-takeover abnormal share returns of the acquirer.  t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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  SAMPLE 
  Hostile takeovers  Friendly takeovers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




















































   0.0977 
(1.54) 
   -0.0011 
(-0.03) 
F-statistic 8.17 10.78  16.40 7.54 10.41 6.57 
p-value  (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0020) 
Adjusted R
2  0.20 0.26 0.21 0.10  0.1438  0.084 
N  58  58  58  123 123 123 



































   0.0162 
(0.20) 
   -0.0443 
(-0.89) 
F-statistic 0.26 0.71    0.15 0.51 0.79 
p-value (0.6146)  (0.4014)  (0.7022)  (0.4786)  (0.3746) 
Adjusted R
2  -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 N  58  58  58  123 123 123 

































   0.7097 
(0.98) 
   -0.0948 
(-0.30) 
F-statistic 1.29 0.28 0.96 0.75 0.05 0.09 
p-value  (0.2602) (0.6013) (0.3324) (0.3870) (0.8219) (0.7642) 
Adjusted R
2  0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
N  58  58  58  123 123 123 
a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively, using a two tailed test 
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Notes 
 
1 See, e.g., Martin and McConnell (1991), Franks and Mayer (1996), and 
Schwert (2000). 
2 See, e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). 
3 See, e.g., Franks and Mayer (1996), and Schwert (2000). 
4 See, e.g., Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Herman and Lowenstein 
(1988), and Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1997).  
5 See, e.g., Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Bhide (1989), and Franks 
and Mayer (1996). 
6 There is also strong evidence of high target management turnover 
following hostile takeovers (Martin and McConnell, 1991). 
7 Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989), and Servaes (1991) find that 
shareholder wealth gains are significantly higher in takeovers involving 
low q targets and high q bidders.  
8 It is of note that although hostile bids account for a minority of bids in 
terms of number, in terms of bid value they account for the majority of 
U.K. takeover bids. From 1985-95, the real (1998) value of hostile bids 
was £251 billion, whereas the real value of friendly takeovers bids was 
£214 billion. 
9 Compared to the U.S., in the U.K. there are fewer antitakeover 
provisions enshrined in either corporate charters or state legislation. For 
example, the Takeover Code in the U.K. explicitly prevents the 
application of poison pills once a takeover bid has been launched.   
10 The control firms are selected by first matching each sample firm to all 
non-merging firms in the same Datastream industrial classification 
(equivalent to a two-digit SIC code). Secondly, to match on size, we select 
the potential control firm with the book value of assets closest to sample 
firms’ asset size in the year prior to takeover. 
11 U.S. studies (see, e.g., Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992) employ the 
market rather than book value of assets as the denominator because the 
presence of goodwill and positive write-ups to fair values is likely to bias 
downwards accounting return on book asset measures.  However, unlike 
their U.S. counterparts, over the time period of this study U.K. companies 
did not have to carry goodwill in the balance sheet and amortize it against 
income. Instead, they were able to immediately write off the goodwill 
against equity reserves in the balance sheet and so avoid diluting reported 
earnings with goodwill amortization. This gives a result which, save for 
the restatement of acquired assets at fair values, is substantially the same 
as pooling accounting. Consequently, U.K. companies have almost   56
                                                                                                                                                                             
invariably chosen the write-off option, and unlike the U.S., write-ups to 
fair values have very infrequently been positive in the U.K. (Higson, 
1998). Therefore, the downward bias observed in the U.S. does not appear 
to exist in the U.K. 
12 The results are qualitatively unchanged when we extend the analysis to 
4 years. 
13 Barber and Lyon (1996) show empirically that this statistic is uniformly 
more powerful than any parametric t-statistic. We also carry out the 
following analysis using mean measures and parametric t-tests. Unless 
otherwise stated, the results are qualitatively similar. 
14 The control firms are selected by first dividing all U.K. stocks listed on 
Datastream into 50 equal sized portfolios based on their market values at 
the beginning of each calendar year. Secondly, each sample firm is then 
matched with the firm from its size portfolio which has the closest book-
to-market. This procedure is repeated for each calendar year pre- and post-
takeover. If a control firm dies within the year, we replace the returns 
from the month of exit with the returns of the next nearest firm in terms of 
book-to-market within the particular size portfolio. If this control firm 
subsequently dies then we use the next closest firm, and so on. 
15 Barber and Lyon (1997) show empirically that the size- and book-to-
market control firm method yields well-specified Wilcoxon test statistics 
in all sampling situations analyzed. We also carry out the analysis using 
mean measures and parametric t-tests. Unless otherwise stated, the results 
are qualitatively similar. 
16 We also examine the effect of hostile takeovers on the number of 
employees and find similar results. The regression intercept is negative 
but once again statistically insignificant. 
17 We also examine the effect of takeover on cash proceeds from sales of 
disposals of share stakes (excluding associated companies and 
subsidiaries). These proceeds account for a smaller proportion of total 
assets than those from sales of assets. However, the results are identical to 
those for asset disposals.  